Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina
Gretchen Helmke
Although it has been some time since I have read this book, I still consider from time to time Helmke's introduction of the concept of strategic defection. The notion that judges may, out of self-interest, rule against sitting executives in order to signal to incoming executives is very interesting. Helmke's arguments, including use of game theoretical models to illustrate points, make for a compelling case. I highly recommend this book.
Rok:
2004
Wydawnictwo:
Cambridge University Press
Język:
english
Strony:
243
ISBN 10:
0511082053
ISBN 13:
9780521820592
Serie:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Plik:
PDF, 1.77 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2004